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Background. When challenged with information about the future, healthy participants show an optimistically biased
updating pattern, taking desirable information more into account than undesirable information. However, it is unknown
how patients suffering from major depressive disorder (MDD), who express pervasive pessimistic beliefs, update their
beliefs when receiving information about their future. Here we tested whether an optimistically biased information
processing pattern found in healthy individuals is absent in MDD patients.
Method. MDD patients (n=18; 13 medicated; eight with co-morbid anxiety disorder) and healthy controls (n=19)
estimated their personal probability of experiencing 70 adverse life events. After each estimate participants were
presented with the average probability of the event occurring to a person living in the same sociocultural environment.
This information could be desirable (i.e. average probability better than expected) or undesirable (i.e. average probability
worse than expected). To assess how desirable versus undesirable information inﬂuenced beliefs, participants estimated
their personal probability of experiencing the 70 events a second time.
Results. Healthy controls showed an optimistic bias in updating, that is they changed their beliefs more toward
desirable versus undesirable information. Overall, this optimistic bias was absent in MDD patients. Symptom severity
correlated with biased updating: more severely depressed individuals showed a more pessimistic updating pattern.
Furthermore, MDD patients estimated the probability of experiencing adverse life events as higher than healthy controls.
Conclusions. Our ﬁndings raise the intriguing possibility that optimistically biased updating of expectations about one’s
personal future is associated with mental health.
Received 25 October 2012; Revised 6 April 2013; Accepted 11 April 2013
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Introduction
Individuals suffering from major depressive disorder
(MDD) process information about the self, the world
and the future in a maladaptive fashion compared
with healthy individuals (APA, 2000). According to
prominent cognitive theories of depression, such as
Beck’s cognitive model (Beck et al. 1979; Haaga &
Beck, 1995; Disner et al. 2011), Seligman’s learned help-
lessness model (Seligman, 1972) and the more recent
cognitive neuropsychological model (Clark et al. 2009;
Roiser et al. 2012), maladaptive cognitive biases are
central to the development and maintenance of
MDD. Beck’s cognitive model, for example, empha-
sizes the role of maladaptive cognitive schemas and
has led to the development of cognitive therapy, an
effective treatment focused on changing these mal-
adaptive cognitive schemas (Beck, 2005; Beck &
Dozois, 2011). Related neuropsychological models of
depression emphasize the relationship between mal-
adaptive cognition and vulnerability or resilience to
MDD, highlighting that maladaptive cognition may
be causal in the progression of depressive symptoms
(Clark et al. 2009; Roiser et al. 2012).
Cognitive theories of MDD often highlight that
maladaptive cognition manifests as negativity biases
(e.g. Beck et al. 1979). However, in some instances the
behavior of depressed individuals seems to be better
characterized by realism relative to an objective stan-
dard or by an absence of a positivity bias relative to
healthy individuals (Alloy & Ahrens, 1987; Moore &
Fresco, 2012). The general reasoning that MDD may
be related to a reduction, absence or reversal of positiv-
ity biases relative to mental health is motivated by con-
siderable evidence showing that healthy individuals
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are characterized by a diverse array of positivity biases
including illusions of superiority (Taylor & Brown,
1988; Taylor & Brown, 1994; Leary, 2007), illusions
of control (Taylor & Brown, 1988; Thompson et al.
1998), positivity biases in memory (Walker et al.
2003) and also unrealistic optimism about the future
(Weinstein, 1980; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Weinstein &
Klein, 1995; Armor & Taylor, 2002; Puri & Robinson,
2007; Sharot, 2011). However, the precise relationship
between mental health, MDD and cognitive infor-
mation processing biases (or their absence) has
remained surprisingly underexplored.
So far, information processing in MDD patients has
been mostly investigated in tasks that are not directly
related to positivity biases in healthy individuals
(Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Gotlib & Joorman,
2010). For example, depressed individuals show
altered responses to performance feedback in cognitive
tasks such as the Tower of London planning task
(Elliot et al. 1997, 1998) or reversal learning tasks
(Murphy et al. 2003; Robinson et al. 2012; see Eshel &
Roiser, 2010 for review). Furthermore, depressed indi-
viduals show altered reward processing as demon-
strated by signal-detection analyses (Pizzagalli et al.
2005, 2008), computational reinforcement learning
approaches (Huys et al. 2009) and functional neuro-
imaging (Tremblay et al. 2005; Steele et al. 2007; Eshel
& Roiser, 2010). These studies provide considerably
evidence for altered learning and information process-
ing in MDD and discuss whether MDD is better
characterized by negative biases (i.e. increased re-
sponses to negative compared with positive stimuli) or
by a blunting of responses (i.e. an insensitivity to
both negative and positive stimuli) (Eshel & Roiser,
2010; Gotlib & Joorman, 2010). However, studies
on information processing in MMD typically do not
investigate domains in which healthy individuals
tend to show positivity biases.
In the current study, we aimed at investigating cog-
nitive biases in processing information about future
life events. In contrast to healthy individuals (Sharot,
2011), MDD patients show a pervasive pessimism
about their personal future (APA, 2000). For example,
when estimating the likelihood of experiencing posi-
tive and negative everyday life events (e.g. being
invited to a party or getting a parking ticket) within
the next month, individuals with high depressive
symptoms expected less positive and more negative
events than they eventually experienced whereas
healthy participants showed the opposite pattern
(Strunk et al. 2006; Strunk & Adler, 2009). Thus, pre-
vious studies have highlighted that depressed individ-
uals are pessimistic when predicting their personal
future (Cropley & MacLeod, 2003; Strunk et al. 2006;
Strunk & Adler, 2009) but they do not address how
information that challenges these views is incorporated
into existing beliefs.
We have recently shown that healthy individuals
maintain optimistic expectations as a result of selective
updating; that is they process information about their
personal future in a positively biased way (Sharot
et al. 2011, 2012a,b). Speciﬁcally, when healthy individ-
uals estimated the probability of experiencing various
adverse life events (e.g. robbery, Alzheimer’s disease)
and subsequently received information about how
likely these events are to occur to persons living in
the same sociocultural environment, they updated
their beliefs more in response to desirable information
that enforced optimism than to undesirable infor-
mation that enforced pessimism. That is, participants
changed their estimates more when the probabilities
of the adverse events were lower than expected com-
pared with when they were higher than expected,
indicating a striking asymmetry in belief updating.
In the current study we tested the hypothesis that,
unlike healthy individuals, depressed individuals are
characterized by a breakdown of a selective updating
bias in response to information about their future. To
that end, we recruited healthy and MDD participants
and quantiﬁed their belief changes in response to
receipt of both desirable and undesirable information
about future life events.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited by ﬂyers at the Freie
Universität Berlin and from patients at the Charité–
Universitätsmedizin Berlin and the Schlosspark-
Klinik Berlin. Participants were assessed for psychiatric
disorders using a structured clinical interview (SCID-I;
Wittchen et al. 1997) by a cognitive neuroscientist
(C.W.K.), who had been trained by a psychotherapist
in conducting the SCID-I. For four in-patients an
assessment provided by the referring clinical psychia-
trist was used instead of the SCID-I. Participants
completed the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI;
Hautzinger et al. 1994). To relate task-related variables
to participants’ trait optimism, they also completed the
Life Orientation Test – Revised (LOT-R; Scheier et al.
1994). To ensure that healthy controls and MDD
patients were matched on IQ, all participants com-
pleted a test of verbal IQ (the Wortschatztest, WST, a
vocabulary test implemented in the HAWIE-R, the
German adaptation of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale; Schmidt & Metzler, 1992). Participants with
a diagnosis of MDD were assessed on the 21-item
Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HAMD-21;
Hamilton, 1960) by a cognitive neuroscientist (C.W.K.),
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who had been trained by a psychotherapist in asses-
sing the HAMD-21. As patients were only assessed
by one person, inter-rater reliabilities could not be
calculated. Additionally, to assess possible inﬂuences
of participants’ mood state on our task, they com-
pleted a multidimensional mood state question-
naire at the beginning and at the end of the study
(Mehrdimensionaler Beﬁndlichkeitsfragebogen, MDBF;
Steyer et al. 1997). Participants gave informed consent
and were paid. The study was approved by the Ethics
Committee of the Charité – Universitätsmedizin Berlin.
We recruited two groups of participants: the healthy
control group (n=19) included participants with no
psychiatric disorders according to SCID-I, a BDI score
≤10 and no history of MDD. The MDD patients
group (n=19) included participants with a diagnosis
of MDD. One MDD patient was excluded because of
a history of alcoholism (ﬁnal n=18). Co-morbid anxiety
disorders in the MDD group were not excluded (n=8).
Of the 18 MDD patients, six received a single drug and
seven two or more (eight took selective serotonin
reuptake inhibitors, four selective serotonin and
noradrenaline reuptake inhibitors, three bupropion,
two tricyclic antidepressants, two pregabalin, one
melperone, one lorazepam and one promethazine).
Table 1 shows the demographics and clinical character-
istics of the participants and their scores on the mood
state questionnaire.
Stimuli
Stimuli and task were adapted from our previous
studies (Sharot et al. 2011, 2012a,b). The original
English task and stimuli were translated into German
by a native German speaker with English as a second
language (C.W.K.). Seventy short descriptions of nega-
tive life events were used (e.g. Alzheimer’s disease,
robbery; see Table 2 for a complete list of the original
English and the translated German stimuli). For each
adverse life event, the average probability or frequency
of that event occurring at least once to a person living
in the same sociocultural environment as the partici-
pants was determined based on online resources (e.g.
Ofﬁce for National Statistics, Eurostat, PubMed). As
the probabilities of the events are roughly the same
across Western Europe, we used the original event
probabilities (from the UK). Participants were told
that they would see the probability of the event hap-
pening to an average person of a similar background
living in the same place. None of the participants
Table 1. Demographic and clinical characteristics of the participants
Characteristic Healthy controls MDD patients
Signiﬁcant effects
(p<0.05)
n 19 18
Female sex 15 12
Age (years) 26.5 (6.61) 29.1 (7.06)
Education (years) 17.1 (3.46) 15.4 (3.25)
Verbal IQ (WST) 109.84 (7.42) 105.5 (11.8)
LOT-R 16.6 (3.98) 8.3 (4.89) g
BDI 4.3 (3.56) 32.6 (7.96) g
HAMD-21 – 24.7 (6.95)
Co-morbid anxiety disorder 0 8
Medication 0 13
Psychiatric hospitalization 0 11
MDBFa Pre-task Post-task Pre-task Post-task
Good mood – bad mood 32.8 (5.94) 33.4 (5.51) 19.5 (6.79) 20.3 (6.49) g, pre, post
Awake – tired 28.8 (6.41) 29.0 (7.05) 28.8 (6.41) 20.3 (6.68) g, i, post
Calm – agitated 32. 2 (5.76) 32.7 (5.40) 19.8 (6.27) 19.9 (6.03) g, pre, post
MDD, Major depressive disorder; WST, Wortschatztest, a vocabulary test implemented in the HAWIE-R (German
adaptation of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale); LOT-R, Life Orientation Test – Revised; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory;
HAMD-21, 21-item Hamilton Depression Rating Scale; MDBF, Multidimensional Mood State Questionnaire
(Mehrdimensionaler Beﬁndlichkeitsfragebogen); g, signiﬁcant group difference or signiﬁcant main effect: group (p<0.05);
i, signiﬁcant interaction between time and group (p<0.05); pre, signiﬁcant difference between group in pre-task condition
(p<0.05); post, signiﬁcant difference between group in post-task condition (p<0.05).
Data are given as mean (standard deviation) or number of participants.
a Data from two healthy controls were not collected post-task on the MDBF.
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Table 2. List of stimuli
English original German translation
Abnormal heart rhythm Herzrhythmusstörungen
Age-related blindness Altersblindheit
Alzheimer’s disease Alzheimer-Erkrankung
Appendicitis Blinddarmentzündung
Arteries hardening (narrowing of blood vessels) Arteriosklerose (Verkalkung der Blutgefäße)
Artiﬁcial joint künstliches Gelenk
Asthma Asthma
Autoimmune disease Autoimmunerkrankung
Back pain Rückenschmerzen
Being cheated by husband/wife Ehemann/Ehefrau geht fremd
Being convicted of crime für ein Verbrechen verurteilt werden
Being ﬁred gefeuert werden
Bicycle theft Fahrraddiebstahl
Blood clot in vein Thrombose
Bone fracture Knochenbruch
Cancer (of digestive system/lung/prostate/breast/skin) Krebserkrankung (Magen/Darm/Lunge/Prostata/Brust/Haut)
Car stolen Autodiebstahl
Card fraud Bank-/Kreditkartenbetrug
Chronic high blood pressure chronischer Bluthochdruck
Chronic ringing sound in ear (tinnitus) Tinnitus (Ohrgeräusche)
Death before age 60 Tod vor dem 60. Lebensjahr
Death before age 70 Tod vor dem 70. Lebensjahr
Death before age 80 Tod vor dem 80. Lebensjahr
Death by infection Tod durch Infektion
Dementia Demenz
Diabetes (type 2) Diabetes (Typ 2)
Disease of the spinal cord Erkrankung der Wirbelsäule
Divorce Scheidung
Domestic burglary Einbruch in Haus/Wohnung
Drug abuse Drogenabhängigkeit
Epilepsy Epilepsie
Eye cataract (clouding of the lens of the eye) Grauer Star (Linsentrübung)
Fraud when buying something on the internet Betrug bei Internetkauf
Gallbladder stones Gallensteine
Genital warts Genitalwarzen
Gluten intolerance Glutenunverträglichkeit
Having a stroke Schlaganfall
Having ﬂeas/lice Flöhe/Läuse haben
Heart failure Herzversagen
Hepatitis A or B Hepatitis A oder B
Hernia (rupture of internal tissue wall) Eingeweide- oder Leistenbruch
Herpes Herpes
House vandalized Haus/Wohnung wird mutwillig beschädigt
Household accident Haushaltsunfall
Infertility Unfruchtbarkeit
Irritable bowel syndrome (disorder of the gut) Reizdarm
Kidney stones Nierensteine
Knee osteoarthritis (causing knee pain and swelling) Kniearthrose
Limb amputation Amputation von Bein oder Arm
Liver disease Lebererkrankung
Migraine Migräne
More than £30000 of debts Schulden über 50,000 Euro
Obesity Fettleibigkeit
Osteoporosis (reduced bone density) Osteoporose (Knochenschwund)
Parkinson’s disease Parkinson-Erkrankung
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reported doubts about this statistical information. Very
rare and very common events were not included; that
is, all event probabilities lay between 10% and 70%. To
ensure that the range of possible overestimation was
equal to the range of possible underestimation, partici-
pants were told that the range of probabilities lay
between 3% and 77%. We excluded life events that
are clearly related to depressive symptoms such as
severe insomnia or anxiety disorder.
Task
The task was programmed using the MATLAB tool-
box Cogent 2000 (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php).
Participants completed four blocks of stimuli. The
70 adverse life events were split into two lists of
35 events each, which were matched for event prob-
ability. One list was used for blocks 1 and 2, the
other for blocks 3 and 4. In blocks 1 and 3, participants
ﬁrst estimated their probability of encountering
the events and then were presented with the average
probability of the events for a demographically similar
population (Fig. 1). To assess how participants used
the information provided in block 1, they were asked
to re-estimate their likelihood of encountering the
events in block 2. Similarly, the likelihoods of events
estimated in block 3 were re-estimated in block 4.
Estimates and average frequencies were framed as
either ‘happening’ or ‘not happening’ so as to exclude
the possibility that the results could be attributed
to different processing strategies for high or low
numbers. Speciﬁcally, in half of the blocks (either
blocks 1 and 2 or blocks 3 and 4) participants had to
estimate the probability of adverse life events happen-
ing to them (and were presented with the probability
of the event happening for a demographically similar
population) whereas in the other half they estimated
the probability of the events not happening to them
(and were presented with the probability of the
event not happening for a demographically similar
population). List assignment and order of the afore-
mentioned framing were counter-balanced across par-
ticipants. Participants completed two training trials
before blocks 1 and 3 to get familiar with the task
and the change in framing.
On each trial, participants were presented with one
of the 70 adverse life events for 4 s (Fig. 1) and were
instructed to imagine that event happening to them
in the future. Then they provided their estimate of
how likely the event was to happen (or not to happen)
to them in the future. Participants had up to 10 s to
respond using the keyboard. They then saw a ﬁxation
cross for 1.2 s. In the blocks where participants indi-
cated their ﬁrst estimate (blocks 1 and 3), they were
then presented with the average probability of the
event happening (or not happening) for a demographi-
cally similar population for 3 s followed by a ﬁxation
cross of 1.2 s. In the blocks in which participants
re-estimated their likelihood of encountering the
events (blocks 2 and 4), they were not presented with
the average frequencies of the events. The order of
life events was randomized within each block.
Table 2 (cont.)
English original German translation
Restless legs syndrome Syndrom der ruhelosen Beine
Serious hearing problems schwere Hörprobleme
Severe injury due to accident (trafﬁc or house) schwere Verletzungen durch Unfall zu Hause oder im Straßenverkehr
Severe teeth problems when old schwere Zahnprobleme im Alter
Skin burn extremer Sonnenbrand
Sport-related accident Sportunfall
Theft from person Opfer von Taschendieben
Theft from vehicle Diebstahl aus dem Fahrzeug
Ulcer Magen-/Darmgeschwür
Victim of mugging Opfer eines Überfalls auf der Straße
Victim of violence at home Opfer von häuslicher Gewalt
Victim of violence by acquaintance Opfer von Gewalt durch einen Bekannten
Victim of violence by stranger Opfer von Gewalt durch einen Fremden
Victim of violence with need to go to A&E Gewaltopfer mit Notaufnahmenaufenthalt
Witness a traumatizing accident Zeuge eines traumatisierenden Unfalls
Events used during the training sessions
Dying before age 90 Tod vor dem 90. Lebensjahr
Glaucoma Grüner Star
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Memory and subjective scales
After completing the four blocks of the main task
we tested participants’ memory for the information
presented. Speciﬁcally, we asked them to indicate
the average probability of each event happening as
presented previously in blocks 1 and 3 (self-paced).
Participants then rated all stimuli on six subjective
Likert scales (self-paced): vividness (How vividly
could you imagine this event? 1=not vivid at all,
6=very vivid), familiarity (Regardless if this event
has happened to you before, how familiar do you
feel it is to you from TV, friends, movies and so on?
1=not familiar at all, 6 very familiar), prior experience
(Has this event happened to you before? 1=never,
6=very often), emotional arousal (When you imagine
this event happening to you how emotionally arousing
is the image in your mind? 1=not arousing at all,
6=very arousing), negativity (How negative would
this event be for you? 1=not negative at all, 6=very
negative) and controllability (How much control do
you have over this event? 1=not at all, 6=very much).
Data analysis
Data were analyzed using MATLAB and SPSS. All
estimates and average frequencies in the ‘not happen’
sessions were transformed into the corresponding
numbers of the ‘happen’ sessions by subtracting
the respective number from 100. For each event an
First session
(a)
Estimation
error
Estimation
error
Estimation
error
Cancer Cancer
Estimation? +
+
Actual
Likelihood
Cancer
30%4 s max 10 s
Update
Cancer
4 s
max 10 s
1.2 s
(b)
First session
Cancer Cancer
40% +
+
Actual
likelihood
cancer
30%
Actual
likelihood
cancer
30%
First session
(c)
Cancer
1.2 s
3 s
1.2 s
Cancer
10%
Second session
Cancer Cancer
31% +
Update
Second session
Cancer Cancer
14%
+
+
+
Update
Second session
Cancer
Estimation? +
Fig. 1. Paradigm. (a) On each trial participants were presented with a short description of one of 70 adverse life events and
asked to estimate how likely this event was to occur to them in their lifetime. They were then presented with the average
probability of that event occurring to a person living in the same sociocultural environment. The second session was the same
as the ﬁrst session, except that the average probability of the event occurring was not presented again. For each event an
update term was calculated as the difference between the participants’ ﬁrst and second estimations. (b,c) Examples of trials for
which the participant’s estimate was (b) higher or (c) lower than the average probability. Here, for illustration purposes, the
thick black and gray frames denote the participant’s response (either an overestimation or an underestimation respectively).
The black and gray ﬁlled boxes denote information that calls for an adjustment in (b) a desirable (optimistic) or (c) an
undesirable (pessimistic) direction.
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estimation error term was calculated as the difference
between participants’ ﬁrst estimate and the corre-
sponding average probability presented:
estimation error = first estimation
− probability presented. (1)
By this deﬁnition, estimation errors were positive for
overestimations and negative for underestimations.
Note that all life events were negative events and
that the desirability of the information arose out of
whether participants over- or underestimated the
probability of the events. When participants initially
overestimated the probability of the adverse event rela-
tive to the average probability they received desirable
information (i.e. the negative event is less likely to
happen than estimated; Fig. 1b). By contrast, when par-
ticipants underestimated the probability of the event
relative to the average probability they received un-
desirable information (i.e. the negative event is more
likely to happen than estimated; Fig. 1c). Therefore,
for each participant, trials were classiﬁed according
to whether the participant initially overestimated
or underestimated the probability of the event (i.e.
according to whether estimation errors were positive
or negative).
To assess how much participants changed their
ratings after receiving information, an update term
was calculated as the difference between the ﬁrst and
second estimates:
update = first estimate− second estimate. (2)
We expected participants to change their estimates on
average towards the information presented. That is,
for desirable information (overestimations) ﬁrst esti-
mates should be larger than second estimates (i.e.
mean updates for desirable information should be
positive). For undesirable information (underestima-
tions) ﬁrst estimates should be smaller than second
estimates (i.e. mean updates for undesirable infor-
mation should be negative). The crucial test for biased
updating was whether participants changed their esti-
mates numerically more (or less) towards desirable
information than towards undesirable information.
Therefore, we compared absolute mean updates for
desirable and for undesirable information across par-
ticipants. To exclude the possibility that differences in
mean estimation errors across participants and con-
ditions could account for differences in updating, we
calculated scaled absolute mean update scores (i.e.
we divided absolute mean update scores for each par-
ticipant and condition by the respective absolute mean
estimation errors).
Trials were excluded if (1) participants failed to
answer within the allotted time (maximal 10 s) in the
ﬁrst or second session (healthy controls: mean=1.79,
S.D.=1.18; MDD patients: mean=1.50, S.D.=1.29) or (2)
the estimation error was zero (i.e. participants gave a
ﬁrst estimate of their own likelihood that was the
same as the presented probability; healthy controls:
mean=0.68, S.D.=1.20; MDD patients: mean=1.28,
S.D.=1.78). These trials were excluded because they
could not be classiﬁed as desirable or undesirable.
In both cases the number of excluded trials did not
differ between healthy controls and MDD patients as
assessed by Mann–Whitney U tests (all p>0.1).
To test the strength of association between esti-
mation errors and updates, Pearson correlation coefﬁ-
cients were calculated separately for desirable and
undesirable trials within each participant.
Memory errors were calculated as the absolute
differences between the frequencies previously pre-
sented and participants’ recollection of these statistical
numbers:
memory error = |probability presented
− recollection of probability presented|.
(3)
Unless speciﬁed otherwise, we conducted desirabi-
lity (desirable/undesirable) by group (MDD/healthy)
ANOVAs.
Results
Groups did not differ with regard to sex, age, edu-
cation and verbal IQ, as conﬁrmed by independent
t tests, Mann–Whitney U tests or χ2 tests as appropriate
(all p>0.1; Table 1). MDD patients showed lower scores
of trait optimism on the LOT-R compared with healthy
controls (t35 =5.6, p<0.001; Table 1). MDD patients also
reported having more negative mood, and being more
tired and more agitated as assessed by signiﬁcant main
effects of group in group (MDD/healthy) by time (pre-
task/post-task) ANOVAs of the MDBF scores (Table 1).
Additionally, there was a signiﬁcant interaction of
group and time on the subscale ‘awake-tired’ of the
MDBF: pre-task the groups did not differ but post-task
MDD patients were more tired than healthy controls.
Comparison of updating behavior between MDD
patients and healthy controls
Our main hypothesis was that belief updating behav-
ior would differ between MDD patients and healthy
controls. We predicted healthy controls would show
optimistically biased updating (i.e. we expected them
to update their beliefs more in response to desirable
than in response to undesirable information regarding
adverse life events) and that this optimistic bias would
be reduced, absent or reversed in MDD patients.
In line with our hypothesis, there was a signiﬁcant
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desirability (desirable/undesirable) by group (MDD/
healthy) interaction of absolute mean update scores
(F1,35 =6.9, p=0.013, η
2
p=0.17; Fig. 2a; Table 3). This
interaction was characterized by an asymmetry in
belief updating for healthy participants but not for
MDD patients. Speciﬁcally, healthy participants up-
dated their beliefs to a greater extent in response to
desirable, compared with undesirable, information
(t18=3.0, p=0.008). No difference in updating was
evident between desirable and undesirable trials in
MDD patients (t17=–0.11, p>0.9). The signiﬁcant inter-
action was further characterized by reduced updating
in response to desirable information of MDD patients
relative to healthy controls (t35=–2.2, p=0.033), with
no signiﬁcant difference for updating in response
to undesirable information (t35=1.4, p>0.1). The
main effect of desirability was signiﬁcant (F1,35=7.4,
p=0.010, ηp
2 =0.17). The main effect of group was not
signiﬁcant (F1,35=0.73, p>0.3, ηp
2 =0.02).
Additional analyses: updating behavior
To exclude the possibility that the observed difference
in updating between MDD patients and healthy con-
trols was driven by differences in estimation errors
(ﬁrst estimations minus probabilities presented), we
performed an additional ANOVA on scaled absolute
mean update scores (i.e. we accounted for differences
in mean estimation errors by dividing absolute mean
update scores for each participant and condition by
the respective absolute mean estimation errors). The
desirability by group interaction of scaled absolute
mean update scores was signiﬁcant (interaction desir-
ability by group: F1,35=6.0, p=0.020, ηp
2 =0.15; main
effect desirability: F1,35 =0.67, p>0.4, ηp
2 =0.02; main
effect group: F1,35=0.53, p>0.4).
In our previous study on healthy participants, we
analyzed the association between estimation errors
and updates because formal learning models suggest
that updates rely on error signals (i.e. the differences
between expectations and outcomes) (Sharot et al.
2011). The strength of the association between esti-
mation errors and updates is indicative of an optimistic
bias in healthy individuals. Speciﬁcally, for desirable
information estimation errors are more closely tied to
updates than for undesirable information. Given
these previous results in healthy individuals, we
expected, as for updates, a desirability by group inter-
action of the strength of the association between esti-
mation errors and updates. For each participant we
calculated the correlation between estimation errors
and updates separately for desirable and undesirable
trials. There was a signiﬁcant desirability by group
interaction (mean Fisher-transformed Pearson corre-
lation coefﬁcients revealed an interaction of desirability
by group: F1,35 =4.19, p=0.048, ηp
2 =0.11; main effect
desirability: F1,35=26.9, p=0.001, ηp
2 =0.43; main effect
group: F1,35=2.96, p=0.094, ηp
2 =0.08; Table 3). This
further suggests that belief updating shows a less
optimistic pattern in MDD patients compared with
healthy controls.
Relationship between differential updating and
MDD symptoms
Next, we sought to test whether the update bias (i.e.
the difference between updates for desirable versus
undesirable information) was related to depressive
(a)
16 8
(b)
6
4
2
0
15
U
pd
at
e 
bi
as
(a
bs
ol
ut
e 
m
ea
n 
up
da
te
 d
es
ir
ab
le
 m
in
us
 u
nd
er
si
ra
bl
e)
20 25 30
BDI scores
35 40 45 50
–2
–4
–6
–8
–10
14
12
10
8
A
bs
ol
ut
e 
m
ea
n 
up
da
te
6
4
Healthy controls MDD patients
Desirable information
Undesirable information
2
0
Fig. 2. Updating behavior. (a) In the healthy group absolute mean updates were greater on trials where participants received
desirable information than on trials where they received undesirable information. This bias was absent in the major
depressive disorder (MDD) group. (b) Relationship between Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) scores and update bias
(desirable minus undesirable) in MDD patients. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean.
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symptoms as measured by the BDI (Fig. 2b). BDI scores
correlated negatively with the update bias across MDD
patients (Pearson’s r=–0.50, p=0.036) but no signiﬁcant
correlation emerged for healthy controls (r=–0.001,
p=0.996), for which the range of BDI scores was
limited. Thus, MDD patients with more severe symp-
toms showed less optimistic updating and more
pessimistic updating (i.e. updating more in response
to undesirable information compared with desirable
information).
To elucidate whether group differences in update
bias are potentially independent from depression
severity, we tested whether group differences re-
mained when partialling out BDI scores. We con-
ducted a hierarchical regression analysis across all
participants entering update bias as the dependent
variable. As independent variables, we entered BDI
scores on the ﬁrst level and group membership on
the second. BDI scores signiﬁcantly predicted update
bias (F1,35 =8.41, p=0.006) but group membership
explained no additional variance beyond BDI scores
[Fchange(1,34) =0.00, p>0.9], suggesting that differential
updating is not independent of depression severity.
Additional analyses: relationship between
differential updating and participants’
characteristics and task-related variables
To test whether the update bias was related to demo-
graphic characteristics, mood states, task-related vari-
ables or subjective scales, we conducted a stepwise
linear regression analysis entering update bias as
the dependent variable. As independent variables we
entered group membership, BDI, and their interaction,
along with age, gender, education, presence of co-
morbid anxiety disorder, medication status, verbal
IQ, LOT-R scores, initial mood scores (Table 1) and
differential measures (desirable minus undesirable) of
memory errors, reaction times, estimation errors, and
also differential scores on all subjective scales (vivid-
ness, familiarity, prior experience, arousal, negativity,
controllability; Table 3). The model that best predicted
differential updating only included the interaction
of group membership with BDI score (F1,35=8.60,
p=0.006). Demographic characteristics, mood states,
task-related variables or subjective scales were not
retained in the stepwise regression. That is, the update
Table 3. Task-related variables, subjective scales, memory and reaction times
Healthy controls MDD patients Signiﬁcant
effects
(p<0.05)Desirable Undesirable Desirable Undesirable
Task-related variables
Number of trials 32.9 (8.48) 34.6 (8.23) 43.0 (8.97) 24.2 (8.54) v, i, d, u
Number of trials excluded due to
missed answers
0.68 (1.20) 1.28 (1.78)
Number of trials excluded due to
estimation errors of zero
1.79 (1.18) 1.50 (1.29)
Updates 11.96 (6.84) 5.55 (4.81) 7.76 (4.26) 7.65 (4.37) v, i, d
Estimation errors 22.45 (5.65) 17.92 (2.45) 25.98 (6.66) 17.86 (3.33) v
Pearson correlation coefﬁcients
(Fisher transformation): updates and
estimation errors
0.71 (0.31) 0.28 (0.35) 0.44 (0.26) 0.26 (0.32) v, i, d
Memory errors 15.05 (6.26) 13.62 (4.01) 14.68 (7.39) 15.04 (5.93)
Reaction time ﬁrst estimate, ms 2483 (561) 2325 (529) 2434 (831) 2520 (739) i
Reaction time second estimate, ms 1993 (613) 1917 (592) 1944 (745) 1874 (780)
Subjective scales: (1) low – (6) high
Vividness 3.34 (0.73) 2.92 (0.72) 3.72 (0.57) 3.10 (0.55) v
Familiarity 3.34 (0.721) 2.90 (0.79) 3.78 (0.54) 3.42 (0.66) v, g, d, u
Prior experience 1.30 (0.19) 1.16 (0.14) 1.59 (0.29) 1.37 (0.28) v, g, d, u
Emotional arousal 3.57 (1.00) 3.40 (0.92) 3.65 (0.85) 3.53 (0.64) v
Negativity 4.26 (0.67) 4.23 (0.64) 4.06 (0.59) 3.98 (0.67)
Controllability 2.86 (0.85) 3.13 (0.77) 2.62 (0.60) 3.09 (0.63) v
MDD, Major depressive disorder; v, signiﬁcant main effect: valence (p<0.05); g, signiﬁcant main effect: group (p<0.05);
i, signiﬁcant interaction between valence and group (p<0.05); d, signiﬁcant difference between group in desirable condition
(p<0.05); u, signiﬁcant difference between group in undesirable condition (p<0.05).
Data are given as mean (standard deviation).
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bias was inﬂuenced by whether participants were
healthy or depressed and the BDI score predicted the
update bias in MDD patients.
In addition, we speciﬁcally analyzed the relationship
between update bias and LOT-R scores. In MDD
patients, LOT-R scores correlated with the update
bias (r=–0.52, p=0.027) but they did not explain
additional variance beyond the BDI in a hierarchical
regression [Fchange(1,15) =1.107, p>0.3]. In healthy con-
trols, LOT-R scores did not correlate signiﬁcantly
with the update bias (r=–0.19, p>0.4).
Additional analyses: comparison of initial estimates
between MDD patients and healthy controls
In accord with the general pessimistic tendency of
MDD patients, MDD patients initially estimated
their overall probability of experiencing adverse
life events as greater than healthy controls (MDD
patients: ﬁrst estimate=39.9, S.D. =8.20; healthy con-
trols: ﬁrst estimate=31.5, S.D.=7.47; t35=3.3, p=0.002).
MDD patients overestimated their probability of
experiencing negative life events in relation to the
average frequencies for a demographically similar
population; that is mean estimation errors (ﬁrst esti-
mation minus probability presented) were positive
and signiﬁcantly different from zero (estimation
error: mean=10.4, S.D. =8.18 ; t17=5.4, p<0.001). This
was not the case for healthy controls (estimation
error: mean=1.80, S.D. =7.40; t18=1.1, p>0.3). Mean
estimation errors differed between groups (t35=3.3,
p=0.002).
As MDD patients were more pessimistic overall
compared with healthy controls, the number of over-
estimations (desirable trials) and the number of under-
estimations (undesirable trials) differed between the
two groups. Speciﬁcally, there was a signiﬁcant desir-
ability (desirable/undesirable) by group interaction
of the number of trials (interaction desirability by
group: F1,35=13.6, p<0.001, ηp
2 =0.28; main effect desir-
ability: F1,35=9.40, p=0.004, ηp
2 =0.21; Table 3). For
MDD patients the number of trials with desirable
information was greater than the number of trials
with undesirable information (t17=4.6, p<0.001)
because they overestimated the probabilities more
often than they underestimated them. For healthy con-
trols the number of trials with desirable and undesir-
able information did not differ (t18=–0.46, p>0.6).
Furthermore, the interaction was characterized by
MDD patients receiving desirable information on
more trials and undesirable information on less trials
than healthy controls (desirable: t35=3.54, p=0.001;
undesirable: t35=–3.80, p<0.001). There was no group
difference in the overall number of trials (main effect
group: F1,35=0.25, p>0.6, ηp
2 =0.01).
Taken together, even though MDD patients received
more desirable information than healthy individuals
(and thus had more opportunities to change their
beliefs in an optimistic direction), MDD patients
showed no evidence for optimistically biased updating.
Additional analyses: memory, subjective rating
scales, framing and reaction times
Differences in updating are not explained by differ-
ences in memory for the presented probability, by
differences in subjective ratings of events, or by differ-
ences related to the framing of the presented prob-
ability. Speciﬁcally, we asked participants to recollect
the presented probability of the event happening and
computed memory errors for each event as the absol-
ute differences between participants’ recollection and
the probabilities presented. There was no signiﬁcant
desirability by group interaction for absolute memory
errors (interaction desirability by group: F1,35=1.46,
p>0.2, ηp
2 =0.04; main effect desirability: F1,35=0.52,
p>0.4, ηp
2 =0.02; main effect group: F1,35 =0.08, p>0.7,
ηp
2 =0.00; Table 3). Additionally, we asked participants
to rate all negative events on six scales for vividness,
familiarity, prior experience, emotional arousal, nega-
tivity and controllability. There was no signiﬁcant
desirability by group interaction of any of these
measures (all p>0.1; see Table 3 for signiﬁcant main
effects).
To control for framing effects (effects due to infor-
mation being presented in a positive or negative
context) we asked participants to estimate how likely
the events were to happen on half of the trials and
how likely they were not to happen on the other
half of the trials. In a frame (happen/not happen) by
desirability by group ANOVA, only the desirability
by group interaction reached signiﬁcance (F1,34=5.74,
p=0.022, ηp
2 =0.14; all other main effects and inter-
actions: p>0.1; one healthy participant had to be
excluded from this analysis because there were no
trials in the desirable-happen condition). Thus, the
framing of the estimates had no effect on updating
behavior.
Reaction times for the ﬁrst estimate did not
show signiﬁcant main effects of desirability or group
(all p>0.1) but a signiﬁcant interaction (F1,35=5.98,
p=0.020, ηp
2 =0.15; Table 3). The interaction was
characterized by healthy controls being slower for
estimates for which they subsequently received desir-
able information compared with estimates for which
they subsequently received undesirable information
(t18=–0.46, p=0.006). This was not the case for MDD
patients (p>0.3). Reaction times for the second estimate
showed no signiﬁcant main effects or interaction (all
p>0.5; Table 3).
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Nevertheless, differential measures (desirable minus
undesirable) of memory errors, scores on all subjective
scales and reaction times were included in the stepwise
linear regression analysis described earlier, which
revealed that only the interaction of group member-
ship with the BDI score was retained in the model
that best predicted differential updating.
Discussion
We show an absence of optimistic bias in belief up-
dating in depressed individuals and this absence
correlated with their symptom severity. Healthy indi-
viduals updated their beliefs more when presented
with desirable information about the likelihood of
experiencing adverse life events relative to undesirable
information. By contrast, updating from desirable
versus undesirable information correlated with symp-
tom severity in MDD patients: less severely depressed
individuals showed a positive bias but more severely
depressed individuals showed a negative bias (i.e.
they update more from undesirable compared with
desirable information). Overall, this resulted in an
absence of updating asymmetry across our sample of
depressed individuals. Note that both groups were
responsive to the information presented in the task
and updated their estimates accordingly. The key
difference between the groups was that, whereas con-
trols showed a valence-dependent updating bias, the
MDD group on average showed an absence of this
bias. This lack of biased updating in MDD patients
was due to reduced updating from desirable infor-
mation about the future.
The observed pattern was selective for updating be-
havior (i.e. memory for the information presented and
subjective ratings of the events did not show inter-
actions between the two groups and the desirability
of the information). The current results in healthy indi-
viduals replicate our previous ﬁndings (Sharot et al.
2011, 2012a,b) in a German sample and are in line
with studies demonstrating that healthy individuals
see emotionally laden future events through rose-
colored spectacles (Sharot et al. 2007; Szpunar et al.
2012).
In accord with cognitive theories of depression (e.g.
Beck et al. 1979), depressed individuals exhibited a
pessimistic view of the future, evident in their inﬂated
estimates of the probabilities of experiencing adverse
events relative to controls and to the average probabil-
ities of these events in the population. These results are
also in line with previous studies (Strunk et al. 2006;
Strunk & Adler, 2009) showing that depressed individ-
uals expect more negative events and less positive
events within the upcoming month than healthy
controls. In our task, MDD patients received more
desirable and less undesirable information because
of their pessimistic views. Nevertheless, in contrast
to controls, MDD patients did not take desirable infor-
mation more into account than undesirable infor-
mation but showed an absence of optimistically
biased updating despite receiving more information
that would warrant such an optimistic bias. It is poss-
ible that the more optimistic expectations of healthy
compared with depressed individuals are a result of
increased responsiveness to desirable information rela-
tive to negative information regarding the future;
although cause and effect may also be reversed.
Taken together, the current study showed that de-
pressed individuals were characterized by pessimis-
tic expectations and the absence of an optimistic
updating bias.
Compared to many previous studies that have
shown evidence for altered learning and feedback pro-
cessing (Gotlib & Joorman, 2010; Eshel & Roiser, 2010),
our study is more directly related to the research on
positivity biases in healthy individuals. That is, partici-
pants in our study received explicit information about
the personal probability of future life events whereas
participants in previous studies typically received out-
comes in the form of performance feedback, reward or
punishment (e.g. Steele et al. 2007; Huys et al. 2009;
Chase et al. 2010; Robinson et al. 2012). Using infor-
mation about future life events, we show that the
updating behavior of the MDD patients was less
responsive to desirable information relative to controls,
but similarly responsive to undesirable information.
Therefore, the updating behavior of the MDD patients
in our task seems to be better described by a lack of a
positivity bias than by notions of general emotional
blunting, as discussed in previous studies (see Eshel
& Roiser, 2010).
Testing whether the updating bias shown by healthy
individuals is adaptive is beyond the remit of the pre-
sent study. However, the relative absence of optimisti-
cally biased updating in MDD needs to be considered
in the context of previous research suggesting that
positivity biases can be adaptive for mental and phys-
ical health and also economic success (Taylor & Brown,
1988, 1994; Scheier & Carver, 1992; Weinstein & Klein,
1995; Peterson, 2000; Armor & Taylor, 2002; Haselton
& Nettle, 2006; Leary, 2007; Puri & Robinson, 2007;
McKay & Dennett, 2009; Varki, 2009; Johnson &
Fowler, 2011; Sharot, 2011). For example, all else
being equal, it seems that optimists live longer, recover
faster from diseases (see Rasmussen et al. 2009 for
review), and earn more (Puri & Robinson, 2007). This
needs to be weighted by evidence that extreme opti-
mists do engage in unhealthy and risky behavior
such as smoking and failing to save for retirement
(Puri & Robinson, 2007; see Sharot, 2011 for review).
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Mild to moderate positivity biases may exert an
adaptive effect in at least three ways. Positive beliefs
can reduce stress and anxiety (Solberg Nes &
Segerstrom, 2006). They can enhance a motivation to
obtain desired goals; for example, optimists exercise
more and work harder (Puri & Robinson, 2007; see
Sharot, 2011 for review). Furthermore, positive beliefs
enhance exploratory behavior that can enhance indi-
vidual and group success (see Sharot, 2011 for review).
In the context of MDD, recent research suggests
that depressed individuals beneﬁt from therapy
approaches that focus on inducing positive biases,
such as positive psychology interventions (Sin &
Lyubomirsky, 2009) and cognitive bias modiﬁcation
(Hallion & Ruscio, 2011).
Future studies are needed to determine the general-
ity of our ﬁndings in a larger sample that includes
more male participants, and also to determine possible
inﬂuences of medication and co-morbidity on the
observed updating behavior. Importantly, we empha-
size that the current study examines biased updating
for negative but not for positive life events. Previous
studies have shown that a similar updating bias exists
in healthy individuals when they learn about positive
stimuli (Eil & Rao, 2011; Möbius et al. 2011; Korn
et al. 2012; Wiswall & Zafar, 2013), but whether such
a lack of bias exists in MDD patients for positive events
is an empirical question that needs to be tested.
The optimistic updating pattern described for
healthy participants in our task might be associated
with resilience to depression. Our study does not
address whether altered information processing has a
causal role in MDD. Longitudinal studies are needed
to establish whether an absence of optimistically
biased processing precedes the onset of depressive
episodes and whether an increase in optimistic updat-
ing predicts treatment effects. Future studies will also
be crucial in examining whether techniques that
enhance updating from desirable information and/or
techniques that reduce updating from undesirable
information might be beneﬁcial in the treatment of
depression. Our results provide a starting point for
such investigations by suggesting that an absence of
optimistically biased belief updating of information
regarding future life events may be relevant for mental
health.
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